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Abstract
The paper presents a framework for the formulation and testing of ontological theories embodied in
human cognition, concentrating primarily on the domain of geographic categories. Evidence for and
against alternative theories of cognitive categories, for example on the part of E. Rosch and her
associates, has been hitherto based primarily on studies of categorization of entities of table-top space
(pets, tools, fruits). We hypothesize that the structure of our categories does not remain constant as
we move from categories of objects at manipulable scales to geographic categories such as nation,
mountain, river. More precisely: Geographic objects are not merely located in space, they are tied
intrinsically to space in such a way that they inherit from space many of its structural (mereological,
topological, geometrical) properties. Categorization in the geographic world is often size- or scale-
dependent (consider: pond, lake, sea, ocean), and to a much greater extent than in the world of table-
top space, the realization that a thing or type of thing exists at all in the geographic world may have
individual or cultural variability. Geographic objects are in very many cases the products of
delineation within a continuum, and the boundaries of such objects are themselves highly salient
phenomena for purposes of categorization. A battery of experiments is described to test these
hypotheses and to serve as a basis for more detailed ontological theorizing.
1. Introduction
Ontology, since Aristotle, has been conceived as a sort of highly general physics, a science of the
types of entities in reality, of the objects, properties, categories and relations which make up the
world. At the same time ontology has been for some two thousand years a speculative enterprise. It
has rested methodologically on introspection and on the construction and analysis of elaborate world-
2models and of abstract formal-ontological theories. In the work of Quine and others this ontological
theorizing in abstract fashion about the world was supplemented by the study, based on the use of
logical methods, of the ontological commitments or presuppositions embodied in scientific theories.
In recent years both types of ontological study have found application in the world of information
systems, for example in the construction of frameworks for knowledge representation and in database
design and translation. As ontology is in this way drawn closer to the domain of real-world
applications, the question arises as to whether it is possible to use empirical methods in studying
ontological theories. More specifically: can we use empirical methods to test the ontological theories
embodied in human cognition? In what follows we set forth the outlines of a framework for the
formulation and testing of such theories as they relate to the specific domain of geographic objects
and categories. 
Objects, properties, categories and relations are what they are, independently of how people
think of them. Some objects, properties, categories and relations, however, are the products of human
cognition. This holds not least in the geographic realm, where many of the entities with which we
have to deal may be conceived by analogy with shadows cast on the surface of the earth by human
practices of specific sorts. In relation to such entities empirical testing makes reasonable sense. We
describe a testing methodology in which the more traditional methods of ontology will guide the
formulation of questions t  be tested and the construction of the framework in which the results of
testing shall be expressed.
2. Theories of Conceptual Organization
We begin with the general topic of human cognitive categories such as rabbit, electron, island. Such
categories xist in two forms: on the one hand as concepts on the side of human subjects; on the other
hand as kinds on the side of reality. On the classical view, dating back to Aristotle, each concept or
kind is associated with certain defining attributes or properties which suffice to determine exactly
which objects fall within the relevant extension. On more recent views, categorial kinds are to be
understood by analogy with a mathematical set. All objects within the extension set are equally
representative nstances of the category, and for each object or event it is fully determinate whether
or not it falls under a given category.
Geographers, like other scientists, have typically accepted this model of categories as sets in the
mathematical sense, and the model is presupposed for example in work on cartographic data
standards ( ee Mark 1993, 1993a). As an account of the categories used by ordinary humans in
everyday situations, however, the model has obvious defects. First, and most obviously, not every
3set in the mathematical sense is a class in the sense of kind or category. Hence we need to go beyond
set theory in order to fill this gap. But further, as has been shown by Rosch (1973, 1978) and others
(see for example Keil 1979, Estes 1994), for most such categories, and for most people, some
members are better examples of the class than are others; furthermore, there is a great degree of
agreement among human subjects as to what constitute good and bad examples. Human cognitive
categories often possess a radial structure, having prototypes or more central or typical members
surrounded by a penumbra of less central or less typical instances. Sparrows and crows are more,
ostriches and flamingoes less typical instances of the category bird.
Rosch raised the following question: Why do children learn so readily category-terms like duck,
zebra, clock, fork while they experience difficulties learning terms like ma ma  orutensil? The
former list of terms belongs to what she calls the ‘basiclevel’ of cognitive classification, the level on
which categories most easily learned in given domains of discourse are to be found. This basic level
is a compromise between two opposing goals, that of informativeness, and that of minimizing
categories based on irrelevant distinctions. The basic level (chair, apple) thus falls between the
superordinate l vel (furniture, fruit), which is in general insufficiently informative, and the
subordinate l vel (lounge chair, golden delicious), which adds too little informativeness for its
additional cognitive cost. Measures of our perception of stimuli, of our responses to stimuli, and of
our communication, all converge on the same basic level.
3. The Special Case of Geographic Categories 
Psychologists and other cognitive scientists have developed a range of alternative theories about the
nature of categories, of which Rosch’s prototype theory is one important example. Evidence for and
against these various theories is, however, based almost entirely on empirical studies of categorization
of entities of table-top space, such as small pets, tools, and other manipulable artifacts, or of abstract
entities (properties) such as colors and diseases. A question that has not been raised is whether the
structure of our categories is constant as we move beyond examples derived from objects at table-top
or manipulable scales and turn to examples derived from the sphere of geographic objects. Are there
peculiarities of geographic categories such as nation, mountain, river, that set them apart from
categories of other sorts? Such peculiarities might include: 
(1) Geographic objects are not merely locat d in space, they are tied intrinsically to space in such
a way that they inherit from space many of its structural (mereological, topological, geometrical)
properties. For entities on the sub-geographic scale, the ‘what’ and the ‘where’ are almost always
independent. In the geographic world, in contrast, the ‘what’ and the ‘where’ seem to be much more
closely intertwined. 
(2) Categorization in the geographic world is often size- or scale-dependent (consider: pond,
4lake, sea, ocean). 
(3) To a much greater extent than in the world of table-top space, the realization that a thing or
type of thing exists at all in the geographic world may have individual or cultural variability. 
(4) Geographic objects are in v ry many cases the products of delineation within a continuum,
a continuum through or within which other types of objects, including human agents, live and move.
(5) The boundaries of the objects with which we have to deal in the geographic world are
themselves salient phenomena for purposes of categorization. These boundaries may be crisp or
graded, and they may be subject to dispute. Moreover, the identification of what a thing is may
influence the location and structure of the boundary. For example, if something is a marsh, its
boundary may be further up the slope than if the same thing is considered to be a lake. 
 
4. Towards an Ontological Theory of Geographic Objects 
In what follows we shall use ‘entity’ and ‘object’ synonymously as ontological terms of art
comprehending things, relations, boundaries, events, processes, qualities, quantities of all sorts. More
specifically, in the context of geographic ontology, ‘object’ and ‘entity’ shall comprehend regions,
boundaries, parcels of land and water-bodies, roads, buildings, bridges, and so on, as well as the parts
and aggregates of all of these. 
Geographic objects are spatial objects on or near the surface of the earth. Furthermore, they are
objects of a certain minimal scale (roughly: of a scale such that they cannot be surveyed unaided
within a single perceptual act). Geographic objects are typically complex, and they will standardly
have parts. An adequate ontology of geographic objects must therefore contain a theory of part and
whole, or mereology (Simons 1987). 
Geographic objects do not merely have constituent object-parts, they also have boundaries,
which contribute as much to their ontological make-up as do the constituents that they comprehend
in their interiors. Geographic objects are prototypically connected or contiguous, but they are
sometimes scattered or separated. They are sometimes closed (e.g., lakes), and sometimes open (e.g.,
bays). The above concepts of contiguity and closure aretopological notions, and thus an adequate
ontology of geographic objects must contain also a topology, a theory of boundaries and interiors,
of connectedness and separation. The latter must be integrated with a mereological theory of parts
and wholes to form a ‘mereotopology’ (Smith 1996, Smith and Varzi 1997), a theory able to do
justice to the fact that spatial regions form a relational system, comprising also containment relations,
separation relations, relations of adjacency and overlap, and so on (Egenhofer and Herring 1991;
Mark and Egenhofer 1994a; Cohn and Gotts 1994). 
5An object is ‘closed’ in the mereotopological sense, if it includes its outer boundary as part; it
is ‘open’ if this outer boundary is included rather in its complement. Ordinary material objects are in
unproblematic fashion the owners of their surfaces. Where a complement meets an object of this sort,
the object will be closed and the complement open (Asher and Vieu 1995). Regarding geographic
objects, however, matters are not so simple. Consider the mouth of a bay, where the hole meets the
open sea. Here a choice as to where we place the boundary would seem arbitrary, and a parallel
situation is encountered vis-à-vis the borders separating hills and valleys. This arbitrariness seems to
be an especially common feature of the geographic world, and we hypothesize that it will imply
important features of geographic objects in general and of their boundaries in particular.  
Geographic categories track not only mereology and topology but also qualitative ge metry (the
theory of concavity, convexity, of shortness and longness, the theory of being roughly round or
roughly dumbbell shaped; see Cohn et al. 1997, 1997a; Smith and Varzi, in press). A theory of
geographic categories must include, too, a the ry of dimension, since it is a highly salient feature of
such objects that theyma  be zero-, one-, two- or three-dimensional. Consider the North Pole, the
Arctic Circle, Norway (a two-dimensional object with a curvature in three-dimensional space), or the
North Sea. It is an important feature of many geographic terms that they may allow a switching from
one sort of dimensional representation to another. Thus ‘North Sea’ may refer either to the three-
dimensional body of water, or to the two-dimensional surface. Such shifting of reference implies also
an analogous shifting on the level of conceptual categories. ‘Bay’ or ‘sound’ may refer to the
surrounding land, or to the indentation in the shoreline, or to a part of the shoreline, as well as the
sheet or body of water. There are correspondingly different meanings of ‘in’ (and of other spatial
prepositions) according to what the relevant dimension in a given context might be: the island is ‘in’
the lake means that it protrudes from the surface of the lake; the submarine is ‘in’ the lake means that
it is completely submerged within the corresponding three-dimensional volume.
An ontological theory of geographic objects must include further a theory of location, or more
precisely a theory of the relation of being located at which holds between things on the one hand
(roads, forests, wetlands), and the regions in or at which they are located on the other (Casati and
Varzi 1996).
5. Geographic Categories, Types of Predication, and Scale Continua 
Ontologist  since Aristotle have distinguished between two sorts of predications: categorial
predications as we are here using this term (called by Aristotelians ‘predications in the category of
substance’), for example: is a man, is a fish, is a lake, etc.; and accidental predications (or
‘predications in the category of accident’), for example: is red, is colored, is big, is hungry. The
former tell us under what category an object falls. They tell us what an object is. The latter tell us
6how an object is, per accidens, at a given moment, what state the object is in, or what process it is
undergoing; thus they pertain to ways in which instances of the relevant categories change from
occasion to occasion. 
For objects of table-top space, now, predications of location and size are almost always
accidental: practically all such objects can move, and animate objects (which are among the most
salient) change size in regular ways over time. Terms for basic-level categories at table-top scales will
thus not code for location or size. They will not code, either, for position (table-top categories do not
change category, for example, when they are upside down). Within the realm of geographic objects,
however, matters are quite different. Here, at least within the time-scales relevant to the development
of human cognitive capacities, almost all objects do not move or grow. Size, shape and position may
thus be matters for categorical predication. Good candidate basic-level terms will therefore often form
series, as illustrated by the case pond – lake – sea – ocean, bay – cove, mountain – hill – hillock, of
a sort which seem to be common for geographic categories and rare elsewhere.
6. Problems with Geographical Extensions of Theories of Categorization
Based on the Phenomena of Table-Top Space 
Our cognitive acts are directed towards spatial objects in the world. But these acts themselves exist
in the spatial domain in virtue of the fact that they are tied to our bodies, so that some of our spatial
concepts, like h re or there, are egocentric. In contrast to other families of categories, therefore,
conceptual categories in the spatial realm relate to their objects in manifold fashion: i) through
abstract models or representations of space in our minds, as when we think, abstractly, about whether
the Bay of Biscay is to the North or to the South of Long Island; ii) through a concrete being-in-
space, as when we use indexical spatial concepts like yonder, to the right, down east, etc.; and iii)
through different sorts of combinations of these two. Matters are complicated still further by the fact
that, because we are in space, are surrounded by space, and are not able to manipulate space itself,
our cognitive representations of space may be underdefined or erroneous. Objects of geographic
categorization are too large to be taken in within a single act of perception, and thus a fortiori they
are too large to serve easily as targets of comparison. Some theory, and much additional contextual
knowledge will be required for categorization purposes, and for this reason, too, geographic
categories may be expected to show marked individual or culture-related differences. There is,
incidentally, an analogous problem in regard to the use of normal, ostensive means in referring to
geographic objects. As Bennett writes: 
there is no practicable way of giving a hurricane the name ‘Gloria’ unless you say something
like ‘Gloria is the hurricane that …’. You might stand in the middle of the hurricane, wave
your arms, and shout ‘This is Gloria’, but the rest of us don’t know how far your ‘this’ is
7meant to reach, and so we don’t know what you are calling ‘Gloria’ (1988, p. 3). 
The table-top examples that have traditionally been treated in the literature on categorization
differ from geographic examples also in other respects. First, they almost always involve discrete,
movable items, items which can be observed from all sides, items which do not change category when
inverted. And while research on categorization by cognitive scientists does indeed indicate that
humans tend quite generally to discretize, even where it is essentially continuous phenomena which
are at issue, an adequate ontology of geographic kinds should embrace not only categories of discreta
but also categories that arise in the realm of continuous phenomena, above all categories of large-
scale continuous phenomena within which discrete objects are contained or located and through or
along which they can move. (See Brogaard, Peuquet and Smith 1999.)
The theoretical concentration on independently movable and  manipulable, table-top examples
tend further to reinforce a view according to which nature can be cut at its joints—that is, a view to
the effect that there is a true, God-given structure, which science attempts to make precise. As we
have seen, however, geographic categorization involves a degree of human-contributed arbitrariness
on a number of different levels, and it is in general marked by differences in the ways different
languages and cultures structure or slice their worlds. It is precisely because, as we hypothesize, many
geographical kinds result from a more-or-less arbitrary drawing of boundaries in a continuum that the
category boundaries will likely differ from culture to culture, in ways that can, under some conditions,
lead to conflict between one group or culture and another. (See Smith 1997.)
Finally, the most often studied table-top examples form a family of separate categorial systems
possessing simple genus-species tree structures organized in terms of greater and lesser generalities,
each tree having little to do with the other trees. Thus, for example, the category bird nd its sub-
categories will have little interaction with the category-families utensil or item of clothing. We
hypothesize that geographic categories, in contrast, because they relate to objects intrinsically
interrelated together within a single domain (called space), form categorial systems that interact more
intimately to form a single structure. Thus many geographic categories form mutually interdependent
pairs (hill/valley, land/water, bay/promontory) in a way which is rare among standard categories of
objects in a space of table-top extent.
7. The Realm of Fiats 
Geographic objects will often be identified by defining the locations of their boundaries. We have
distinguished two kinds of boundaries: bona fide boundaries and fiat boundaries (Smith 1994, 1995,
Smith and Varzi 1997). Bona fide boundaries are those that correspond to genuine discontinuities
in the world; fiat boundaries are projected into geographic space at locations wholly or partly
8independent of such discontinuities. The surfaces of extended objects such as lakes or islands are
boundaries of the bona fide sort. Roads and water courses can also readily be considered to be bona
fide boundaries. In contrast, most state and provincial borders, as well as many county and property
lines and the borders of census tracts and of postal and electoral districts, provide examples of outer
boundaries of the fiat sort, especially in those cases where, as in the case of Colorado or Utah, they
lie skew to any pre-existing qualitative differentiations or spatial discontinuities (coastlines, rivers)
in the underlying territory. Boundaries of areas of some given soil type, of wetlands, or of bays or
mountains are also at least partly of the fiat type, although they may result from cognitive rather than
legal-administrative processes. Bona fide boundaries exist in all domains of reality, from the
microphysical to the cosmological. Fiat boundaries are found and are relevant to categorization
almost exclusively in the realm of geographic entities and in cognate realms of law, politics and
political administration.
Moreover once fiat boundaries have been recognized, it becomes clear that the opposition
between bona fide and fiat boundaries implies a parallel opposition also in relation to boundaries but
in relation to the objects that they bound. Examples of bona fide geographic objects are the planet
Earth, Vancouver Island, and the Dead Sea. Examples of fiat geographic objects include King
County, the State of Wyoming, and the Tropic of Capricorn.
8. Types of Fiat Boundaries 
Fiat boundaries in the geographic realm come into being in virtue of different sorts of demarcations
effected cognitively by human beings. There are fiat objects (deserts, valleys, etc.) that are delineated
not by crisp outer boundaries, but rather by boundary-like regions that are to some degree vague or
indeterminate. Such vagueness is a conceptual matter: if you point to an irregularly shaped
protuberance in the sand and say ‘dune’, then the correlate of your expression is a fiat object whose
constituent unitary parts are comprehended (articulated) through th  concept dune. The vagueness
of the concept itself is responsible for the vagueness with which the referent of your expression is
picked out.
Many obvious examples of fiat objects involve cases where proper parts are delineated or carved
out (by fiat) within the interiors of larger bona fide wholes. Consider the way in which multiple
nations and states may be carved out within a single continental land mass. But there are also fiat
wholes—for example New England, Benelux, the European Union—that are created by the
conjoining of multiple parts into a single composite whole. It seems that we can reasonably assume
of bona fide objects (a person, a rock, the planet Earth) that they are connected in the topological
sense (the solar system may be an exception to this rule); fiat objects, however, may quite generally
be scattered: they may, like Polynesia, be such as to include non-connected bona fide objects within
9larger fiat wholes.
9. Fiats in the Realm of Categories 
The concept of fiat boundary was introduced as a means of doing justice to the fact that we divide
up the spatial reality out there in more or less arbitrary fashion into sub-regions. But there is an
element of arbitrariness or fiat also in the domain of our categories themselves: we can partition the
family of spatial categories in more or less arbitrary ways into sub-categories. Thus, for example,
erms like strait and river represent arbitrary partitions of the world of water bodies. The English
language might have evolved with just one term, or three terms, comprehending the range of
phenomena stretching between s rait and river or, in French, between détroit and fleuve. For while
the Straits of Gibraltar are certainly not a river, and the Mississippi River is certainly not a strait, there
are cases—such as the Detroit and Niagara Rivers and the Bosporus—that exist on the borderline
between the categories. All are flat, narrow passages that ships can sail through between two larger
water bodies (lakes, seas), and all have net flow through them, due to runoff, etc. 
Imagine the instances of a concept arranged in a quasi-spatial way, as happens for example
in familiar accounts of color- or tone-space. Suppose that each concept is associated with some
extended region within this quasi-space in which its instances are contained, and suppose further that
this is done in such a way that the prototypes, the most typical instances, are located in the center of
the relevant region, the less typical instances being located at distances from this center in proportion
to their degree of non-typicality. Boundary cases can now be defined as those cases that are so
untypical that even the slightest further deviation from the norm would imply that they are no longer
instances of the given category at all. 
In this way counterparts of the familiar topological notions of boundary, interior, contact,
separation, and continuity can be defined for the realm of conceptual categories, and the notion of
similarity as a relation between instances can be understood as a topological notion (Mostowski 1983,
Petitot 1995). In the realm of colors, for example, “a is similar to b” might be taken to mean that the
colors of a and b lie so close together in color-space that they cannot be discriminated with the naked
eye. In some cases, there is a continuous transition from one concept to its neighbors in concept-
space, as for example in the transition from peninsula to promontory or from lake to marsh to
wetland. In other cases, categories are separated by gaps (by regions of concept-space that have no
instances). This is so regarding the transition from, say, lake to reservoir.
10. Water in Geographic Space
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Water is an especially distinctive substance that is critical to life. Water occurs at scales from
individual water molecules in water vapor to the great body of water making up the world’s oceans.
Whereas water bodies and water courses make up some of the most distinctive geographic categories,
there nevertheless is a gradation from lakes to wetlands to dry land, and boundaries of individual
water bodies may grade into fringing marshes and thence to terrestrial habitats. 
Consider, for example, the case of lakes. Is a lake a three-dimensional body of water in
geographic space, or a two-dimensional sheet of water, or is it a depression in the Earth’s surface,
(possibly) filled with water? Dry lakes exist, but are they lakes when they are dry, or merely places
where lakes were, and might be again? One place to start is with definitions contained in geographic
or cartographic data standards, or in dictionaries. These definitions represent the consensus among
experts as to the meanings of terms that are used to refer to geographic categories. They thus provide
preliminary evidence as to the nature of the categories themselves.
The U.S. Spatial Data Transfer Standard (SDTS) defines lake as “anystandard body of inland
water.” (See Mark 1993, 1993a) The U.S. National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) defines
lake as the water that composes it, but in the following way: “water contained within a predominantly
natural shoreline that exhibits no appreciable current.” A lak , then, on this ontology is a body of
water of a certain sort. But matters are not so simple, as is made clear by the following reflections
from the discussion of the status of lakes in the more general treatise on the ontology of liquids by
Patrick Hayes (1985a):
Consider now a lake. This is a contained-space defined by geographical constraints. Lake
Leman, for example, is the space contained between the Jura Mountains, Lausanne, the Dent
d’Oche, Thonon, and the Rochers de Naye, below the 400 meter contour (more or less). Its
container is the surface of the earth under it, i.e. the lake bed. I think the only way to describe
lakes, rivers and ponds in the present framework is to say that they are contained-spaces
which are full of water: that is, the pace ends at the surface of the water. To be in the lake
is then, reasonably, to be immersed in water, while to be on the lake is to be immediately
above the water and supported by the lake (cf. on the table), which seems reasonable. Thus
a lake is full by definition. 
A lake is never half full, if Hayes is right. Rather, if it contains only half of its usual volume of water;
then its level is low. A reservoir behind a dam, in contrast, can be half full, or empty. This is a matter
of the ontology of lakes. Hayes contrasts his view with the ontology of water bodies according to
which ponds, lakes, seas, etc. are all pieces-of-water under a different name. On Hayes’ view 
Lake Leman is a fixed object in geographical space whereas in the pieces-of-water ontology,
it would be constantly changing, since the Rhone flows in one end and out the other; it would
be a phenomenon, not an object.
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Is the Hayes ontology more or less adequate as a specification of the relevant portions of our
categorial scheme than the pieces-of-water ontology? This is a question which admits of empirical
testing. 
11. Dimensions for Categories of Geographic Water Bodies 
Apart from size, shape and location, there is a range of further salient dimensions involved in our
categorization f geographic objects. To gain a first assay of what these dimensions might be, we
carried out a pilot study of those geographic categories which fall within the general class of water
bodies. A computer-aided search of an electronic version of the American Heritage Dictionary found
121 definitions that include both the word “body” and the word “water,” but only 73 terms contain
both “body” and “water” in the same noun phrase. Furthermore, many of these referred to parts or
denizens of water bodies, leaving 18 terms whose definition stated that they were “a body of water”
with certain characteristics or restrictions: basin, bay, bayou, brine, dam, drink, harbor, lagoon, lake,
narrow, ocean, pond, pool, sea, sluice, sound, water, and waterway. Figure 1 shows these terms
linked to their superordinate category “body of water,” and other terms in that dictionary that have




When the definitions of the same terms were examined in Webster’s Dictionary of the
American Language, a different semantic etwork emerged (Figure 2). The thicker





Looking at the definitions of the above terms, it is possible to identify some individual descriptive
dimensions that the compilers of these dictionaries felt were important in distinguishing various kinds
of water bodies. These dimensions are size, shape, flow, other water properties, spatial relations, use,
purpose. These will be useful dimensions for interpreting distinctions made among kinds of water
bodies and water courses in the empirical investigation of geographical categories.
12. Previous Empirical Research on Geographic Categories
Although there have been many deductive works addressing classification of geographic objects and
phenomena, including dictionaries of geographic terms and cartographic data standards, there have
been very few empirical studies of geographic categories that have involved testing with human
subjects. The earliest such study that we are aware of involved a small number of categories from
Battig and Montague’s (1968) study of category norms. Two other such studies were conducted
more recently: Tversky and Hemenway’s (1983) research on indoor and outdoor scenes, and Lloyd
et al.’s (1996) investigation of basic-level geographic categories. These three studies are reviewed
in this section, with emphasis on methods and results.
12.1 Battig and Montague’s Research on Category Norms 
Norms for a category are instances of that category that are most commonly given to exemplify the
category itself; they may be exemplars or prototypes of the category, although this is not necessarily
the case. Battig and Montague (1968) used an elicitation-of-examples procedure to determine norms
for examples of 56 categories. Of the categories that they tested, a few were geographic in nature.
More than 400 undergraduate subjects from Maryland and Illinois were given category titles, and
asked to write down in 30 seconds as many “items included in that category as you can, in whatever
order they happen to occur to you.” The subjects went through all 56 categories in this manner. The
researchers tabulated all terms listed, and counted how many times each term was given under each
category, and how often it was the first term mentioned. They also reported correlations between the
rankings by Illinois students and the rankings by Maryland students. Cross-site correlations were
generally high, indicating high stability across the speech communities tested. The lowest three
correlations were for a city (0.689), a state (0.297), and a college or university (0.097), indicating that
variation in examples for categories involving geographic instances rather than categories was itself
varying geographically. 
Of the categories tested by Battig and Montague, one was “a Natural Earth Formation.” A total
of 34 different “earth formations” were listed by at least 10 of the subjects. The ten most frequently-
listed terms, with their frequencies among 442 subjects, were: mountain (401), hill (227), valley
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(227), river (147), rock (105), lake (98), canyon (81), cliff (77), ocean (77), and cave (69). Despite
the fact that the category was not prefixed by “a kin of” or “a type of,” only one particular named
feature was listed: the Grand Canyon was mentioned 14 times. All other terms given 5 or more times
were names of categories, and all but 5 were at a geographic scale. Nothing movable was on the list,
except glacier (very slow moving) and iceberg.
12.2 Tversky and Hemenway’s Research on Indoor and Outdoor Scenes 
Tversky and Hemenway (1983) applied Rosch’s research methods to objects of geographic scale –
in their paper called ‘(outdoor) environmental scenes’. Their goal was to provide a taxonomy of kinds
of environmental scenes and to identify a basic level of scene categorization, the level not only most
commonly used, but also ‘apparently most useful in other domains of knowledge concerned with
environments, for example, architecture and geography’. Forty-seven students at Stanford University
served as subjects in two sets of experiments. In the first, subjects were presented with slides
depicting common and familiar indoor and outdoor scenes and asked to provide a ‘very simple
common ame or label for each of the slides ... the most simple, obvious, direct sort of name that
ordinary people would give for each scene.’ In the second, subjects were required to complete
sentences describing activities with appropriate names for settings, as in “The Kingstons furnished
their ___________ with furniture they built themselves.” There was a high degree of consensus in
both sets of responses, with the basic-level categories beach, mountain, city, and park (categories
dictated to a large degree by choice of stimuli) being preferred even though more specific or more
general terms would have been appropriate. 
12.3 Lloyd et al.’s Research on Basic-Level Geographic Categories 
The third study reviewed here was reported in Lloyd et al.’s (1996) article entitled “Basic-level
geographic categories.” In previous work by Rosch and others, such as work on folk taxonomies of
plants and animals, folk taxonomies often appear to approximate scientific taxonomies, at least
superficially. In contrast, Lloyd et al. propose that the common categories of administrative units in
the United States (country-region-state-city-neighborhood) may be at the same basic level in a
cognitive hierarchy of familiar categories and terms, with place as the superordinate category. In a
departure from Rosch and other pervious workers, their model populates the subordinate category
layer not with subclasses but with instances that are particular cases – such as the South, or Georgia,
or Charleston. Lloyd et al. do not discuss the shift Rosch’s theory in much detail. The shift between
Roschian experimental methods and Lloyd et al.’s work is understandable, since geographic
categories seem to seldom have many subclasses (e.g., kinds of mountains). However, this difference
makes Lloyd et al.’s experimental results more difficult to compare with work for non-geographic
categories. 
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Lloyd et al. tested 11 geographic terms, selected because they were reasonable answers to the
question: “Where is your home?”, and each subject was tested for just one term. Place was sted as
the superordinate level, and country, region, state, city, and neighborhood were hypothesized to be
at the basic level. The five subordinate level tests asked the subjects to list characteristics, activities,
and parts for their home country, their home region, their home state, their home city, or their home
neighborhood, listing that specific home place on each page of their response. The experimental
protocol asked subjects to list as many “characteristics, activities or parts they associated with a
particular geographic term,” with 90 seconds for characteristics, 90 seconds for activities, and 90
seconds for parts (Lloyd et al. 1996, p. 187). Lloyd et al.’s main findings were that fewer
characteristics, activities, and parts were listed for the superordinate term place han for the other
groups. When averaged across subjects, results for the categories of country, region, state, city, and
neighborhood were all extremely similar, suggesting indeed that they are all conceptual categories at
a common cognitive level, presumably the basic level. They reported only minor differences in
average numbers of characteristics, activities, or parts listed for, say, U.S. states in general, and for
their home state. This appears to confirm our suspicion that testing specific instances (category
members) is not the same as testing subclasses (subordinate categories).
13. Experiments To Elicit Category Norms for Some Geographic Kinds 
We propose to test a total of 17 categories using Battig and Montague’s methods (Battig and
Montague 1968). Six categories are new to this study (bold faced type in Table 1, below), and
eleven are categories already tested by Battig and Montague, seven of which were somewhat
geographic, and four non-geographic. For the eleven categories repeated from Battig and Montague,
we will have a baseline for valuating our results. Some non-geographic categories are included to
make the objective of the study somewhat less obvious to the subjects.
____________________________________________________________
Table 1: Categories to Be Tested in an Elicitation Task
____________________________________________________________
1. a precious stone
2. a unit of distance
3. a type of human dwelling
4. a color
5. a kind of geographical feature
6. a country
7. a crime
8. a weather phenomenon
9. a city
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10. a kind of water feature that would be shown on a map
11. a bird
12. a natural earth formation
13. a kind of geographic feature made by humans (not
“natural”)
14. a US state
15. a kind of human settlement (populated place)
16. a political entity
17. a kind of geographic object that typically has an
indeterminate (fuzzy, graded, or uncertain) boundary
____________________________________________________________
For the categories repeated from Battig and Montague’s study, we can only predict that our
results will replicate theirs. In this section, we provide a brief discussion of anticipated results for the
testing of the five new geographic categories we have added. If experimental results depart from these
expectations, our representations of the naive theory of geographic kinds for the corresponding
populations will have to be revised accordingly. 
A kind of geographical feature. This will be the first truly-geographic category presented to the
subjects. The main question here is whether natural or artificial features will appear on a greater
number of response lists highly, also whether solid ground or water-related features will be more
frequent. We predict mostly natural features, and in roughly the same order as for “a natural earth
formation,” but probably with features made by humans listed more frequently than for “a natural
earth formation.” 
A kind of water feature that would be shown on a map. Based on the ontological work presented
above, we predict that lake (or sea, depending on population) and river will rank first and second
among kinds of water features. If experimental data deny this, we will have to re-think the ontological
framework. We predict that ot er whole water bodies will be next (po d, ocean), then some kinds
of watercourses (stream, creek), then parts of water bodies (strait, bay), and lastly some non-
geographic water objects (puddle, drop), or borderline cases (wimming pool, fish tank). We will pay
particular attention to the frequency ranks of standing water bodies, flowing watercourses, and parts
of water bodies or watercourses, as well as ranking of specific entity types within these groups.
A kind of geographic feature made by humans (not “natural”). Categories such as ro d or city
might be most highly ranked, but our draft ontology for geographic features made by people thus far
only includes those features that pertain to artificial boundary demarcations. For this and the next
category, results of the elicitation of norms will provide input to extensions of the ontology of these
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kinds of things.
A kind of human settlement (populated place). City might be listed first here, but otherwise we
have no prediction of the relative frequency order of village, hamlet, town, borough, campground,
etc., and also have no prediction regarding the ranking of categories of extended settlement zone
(such as township, county, or state) relative to conceptually point-like settlements.
A political entity. We tentatively anticipate an inverse ordering to that invoked by “a kind of
human settlement.” Results also will be compared to Lloyd et al.’s (1996) findings. 
A kind of geographic object that typically has an indeterminate (fuzzy, graded, or uncertain)
boundary. The ontology of geographic objects with indeterminate boundaries is in its infancy,
although some of the material presented in Burrough and Frank (1995) will provide a valuable basis
for the ontology. Responses to this category will provide further starting points for analysis. 
14. Experiments Based on Rosch’s Methods 
15.1 Examples of categories 
Rosch (1973) used Battig and Montague’s norms as input to her “Experiment 3” on judgments about
the internal structure of categories (Rosch 1973, pp. 130-134). She chose eight of Battig and
Montague’s categories for further research: fruit, science, sport, bird, vehicle, crime, disease,
vegetable. From each of these selected categories, Rosch chose 6 instances across a range from very
good to very peripheral members of the categories; she operationalized this criterion by choosing to
test the instances with frequencies closest to 400, 150, 100, 50, 15, and under 5 in Battig and
Montague (out of 442 subjects). She then gave subjects the categories, and for each, the list of 6
instances selected according to the above criteria, and asked subjects to rate, on a scale of 1 to 7, how
good each example was of its category. She found that with few exceptions, instances given most
frequently as exemplars (category norms in Battig and Montague’s experiment) were also judged to
be much better examples of the categories. 
We will include a test based on Rosch’s method, applied to Battig and Montague’s category “A
Natural Earth Formation.”
Q:On a scale of 1 (excellent example) to 7 (poor example), please rate each of the following





2 3 4 5 6 P o o r
Example
a. crater 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
b. gully 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
c. iceberg 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
d. lake 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
e. mountain 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
f. river 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
This same protocol will be used also to test the category norms that result from the geographic
categories included in our own experiment to elicit category norms.
15.2 Numbers of Attributes and Parts 
Following Lloyd et al.’s (1996) use of one of Rosch’s experimental protocols, we will ask subjects
to list as many characteristics of some geographic categories as they can in 90 seconds, and other
subjects to list as many parts of some geographic categories as they can in the same time period.
Following Lloyd et al., each subject will be asked about only one category, and only about
characteristics or parts (not both), at the beginning of a test that includes other questions. For
comparison with Lloyd et al., we will include city in the set of terms tested. The others tested will be
lake, pond, bay, river, hill, mountain, and perhaps others. We hypothesize that these natural
geographic categories will be thought to have many characteristics and few parts.
 
15. Questions on the Nature of Boundaries 
We have hypotheses to the effect that geographic entities are associated with a distinct cognitive
ontology in part due to special features of their boundaries. We will test whether fiat and bona fide
boundaries are commonly considered to be different, and in what ways. We also will test whether
crisp and indistinct boundaries are cognitively distinct. Sample questions that address this point
include:
Q. If an island is divided into two political entities, how is the boundary between the political
entities similar to the boundary of the island itself, and how is it different?
Q. In what ways are the boundary of a country and the boundary of an apple similar, and in what
ways are they different?
Q. List some ways in which the edge of a wetland differs from the edge of a park.
Q. Who do you think owns the boundary between two adjacent land parcels in the area of your
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home town?
a. the owner of the oldest parcel
b. the person who has owned one of the parcels the longest
c. the two parcel owners each own their half of the boundary
d. the boundary is jointly owned by both parcel owners
e. the boundary has no owner
The responses to each of these questions will determine further questions to be asked in later phases.
16. Tests Related to Definitions 
In these tests, subjects would be asked to select the best definition of some water-related terms, in
a multiple choice format:
Q. Which of the following do you think is the be t definition of a “lake”:
a. a large inland body of water
b. a closed loop formed by a shoreline, with a water surface inside it
c. water contained within a predominantly natural shoreline that exhibits no appreciable current
d. an extent of water larger and deeper than a pond
e. a part of the earth’s surface, other than the ocean, covered by still water
f. a depression in the earth’s surface that is normally filled with water
g. a large inland natural sheet of water
h. a large inland body of fresh water or salt water.
Similar questions will ask subjects to choose definitions for river, pond, bay, and other water features.
17. Conclusion: On Empirical Ontology
Empirical ontology as we conceive it will involve two complementary research methods: ontological
work in the traditional sense (largely deductive, introspective, and formal) and research with human
subjects (empirical, inductive). Ontological theories will be used as starting point for the formulation
of experimental protocols designed to establish their degree of fit with corresponding systems of
beliefs embodied in human cognitive systems. Analysis of data from human subjects will then be
examined and generalized to produce compensating adjustments in ontological theories, which will
in general lead to further rounds of empirical testing. (Compare the interplay of formal modeling and
empirical research in Mark and Egenhofer 1994, 1994a, 1995; Egenhofer and Mark 1995.)
The ontological framework to be tested is a multi-leveled construction, involving not only
mereology and topology, but also theories of spatial location and qualitative geometry, theories of
fiat and bona fide boundaries and theories of vagueness and indeterminacy, along the lines of Smith
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and Varzi (1997). In addition to the philosophical literature, another source of ontological theories
is work in the artificial intelligence field (see for example Hayes 1985). In constructing software tools
for merging large databases, it has proved fruitful to develop common ontologies in terms of which
divergent bodies of dataerived from different sources can be unified together into more compact
systems. Ontological engineering of this sort was pioneered by Tom Gruber and his colleagues in
Stanford, and a summary of recent work is represented in Guarino (1998). For spatial applications
see Stock (ed.) 1997, and especially the contribution by Frank. 
Much of the A.I. work on ontology recalls earlier investigations by analytic philosophers on the
ontological commitments of scientific theories. (See Quine 1953) It goes beyond these, however,  in
that it seeks to reconstruct in their entirety the ontological theories embodied in given information
systems and to put refined and simplified versions of these reconstructed theories to practical
purposes within the information systems domain. The work described here is focused on the
ontological theories embodied in human cognition, and it seeks to reconstruct these with the help of
empirical testing. Note that this work is  distinguished from investigations in epistemology: we are
only incidentally concerned with the evaluation of geographic knowledge and with the questions
pertaining to the ways in which human subjects come to know geographic categories. 
The formal-ontological theory projected here will be developed axiomatically using the resources
of first-order predicate logic. This will ensure ready translatability into the languages such as
ontolingua (Gruber 1993) and into other ontology-based frameworks for database translation and
knowledge interchange standardization. The axiomatization will embody a syntactic distinction
between substantial and accidental predications, the former coding categories in a way which can
allow representations of distinctions such as that between base- and non-base-level categories,
dependent and independent categories, and so on. Finally, the axiomatization must enable us to
distinguish, at least in principle, between geographic categories employed within a given culture and
universal geographic categories which all systems of geographic categories share in common. That
is to say, our abstract ontological framework must include at least the possibility of coding both
culture-specific and universal features of human ontological belief-systems. One not inconsiderable
benefit of the methodology here described turns on the fact that, as we hypothesize, trictly formal
investigations in ontology may have important things to tell us about the universal constraints which
all systems of geographic categories must satisfy.
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